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ABSTRACT
Studies frequently report significant divergence between
institutional arrangements promoting judicial independence and
judges’ actual independent behavior, particularly in authoritarian or
semi-authoritarian countries. Many believe that such divergence is
especially likely in China, where the problem of judicial dependence is
deeply embedded in local contexts and historical practices. Drawing
on in-depth interviews with judges and lawyers from three provinces
with diverse socioeconomic demographics, this Article assesses the
judicial accountability reforms launched by the current Xi Jinping
administration, which promise to empower individual judges to decide
cases with minimal interference from superiors. Defying expectations,
this Article finds that the reforms have enabled frontline judges to
decide most cases without obtaining approval from court leaders and
have limited the use of the powerful adjudication committees, making
individual judges considerably more autonomous. It argues that what
enabled this unexpected development is the regime’s recent power
consolidation, which has put an end to China’s decades-old policy
fragmentation and forces local agents to more faithfully implement the
centrally mandated reform plans. The findings shed light on the
relationship between the judges’ local embeddedness and the
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macrostructural dynamics, and compel researchers to reevaluate the
diverse roles contemporary authoritarian regimes play in shaping
judicial behaviors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, courts have become increasingly important
institutions for strengthening authoritarian rule. 1 Moustafa summarizes
several common ways in which courts can make an authoritarian
1. See, e.g., JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW : LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE,
AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 46 (2012) (noting that in Singapore, law and courts haves been
an imporant tool for “ the decimation of opposition parties[,] . . . the dismantling of independent
media[,] . . . and the thwarting of an autonomous civil society.”); TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER : LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
EGYPT 230 (2007) (describing that the Sadat regime established the Supreme Constitutional
Court to attract foreign investment, because “[w]ith unchecked power, authoritarian regimes
have difficulty providing credible commitments to the protection of property rights and therefore
have difficulty stimulating private investment.”); Alexei Trochev, Legitimacy, Accountability
and Discretion of the Russian Courts, in POLITICS AND LEGITIMACY IN POST-SOVIET EURASIA
123 (Martin Brusis, et al. eds., 2016) (noting that the Russian courts provide “a comfortably
flawed instrument nonetheless able to lend a voice to aggrieved citizens without undermining
the nature of the regime [and] provide a legal veil for . . . reigning in political opponents”);
Hootan Shambayati, Courts in Semi-Democratic/Authoritarian Regimes: The Judicialization of
Turkish (and Iranian) Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES 283, 284 (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2008) (describing the Turkish
military limited the effectiveness of elected institutions by subjecting them to judicial review by
the unelected and pro-military judiciary).
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regime more resilient, including exercising control over opposition,
advancing discipline within the bureaucracies, facilitating trade and
investment, and bolstering regime legitimacy. 2 To achieve these
objectives, governments under authoritarian and hybrid regimes
professionalize and empower judiciaries through institutional changes
such as depoliticizing the appointment of judges 3 and securing their
jobs with life tenures. 4 China joined this trend with its latest round of
judicial reforms. Under the banner of “governing the country according
to the law,” the Xi Jinping administration announced its plan to tackle
the decades-old problem of judicial dependence through the centrally
imposed judicial accountability reforms. 5 Essentially, the reforms
promise to empower judges to independently adjudicate cases with
minimal interference from superiors and to hold these judges fully
responsible for the cases they decide.
Despite the various potential benefits listed by Moustafa, there are
many reasons to be skeptical about such promises of judicial autonomy,
especially from an authoritarian regime. Scholars point out that there is
often a significant gap between formal institutional arrangements
promoting judicial independence and judges’ actual autonomous
behavior. 6 For example, successive USSR and Russian leaders,
including Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin, established and strengthened
2. Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC.
SCI. 281, 283 (2014).
3. Tamir Moustafa, Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The Judicialization of
Politics in Egypt, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
132, 138–39 (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2008) (describing the appointment process
of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, under which new justices were nominated by
sitting justices).
4. PETER B. MAGGS ET AL., LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 159
(6th ed. 2015).
5. Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, CCP Central Committee
Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the
Country According to the Law Forward, CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA,
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decisionconcerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-countryaccording-to-the-law-forward/ [https://perma.cc/DVC4-PBZC] (last visited Oct 3, 2018).
6. See, e.g., Lisa Hilbink, The Origins of Positive Judicial Independence, 64 WORLD POL.
587, 587–88 (2012) (claiming “a clear distinction between formal judicial autonomy—that is,
formal or ‘negative’ judicial independence—and independent judicial behavior or ‘positive
independence.’ The former refers to the rules [formal and informal] governing judicial
appointment, discipline, tenure, jurisdiction, and budget, while the latter is behavioral.”); Daniel
Brinks, Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: The Beginning of a New
Millennium?, 40 TEX. INT. LAW J. 595, 597 (2005) (arguing that “formal independence is a
singularly unhelpful construct, especially in the Latin American context.”).
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various institutional mechanisms designed to insulate Russian judges
from extrajudicial influences, including life tenure, non-politicized
nomination and discipline systems, and financial and administrative
autonomy. 7 However, empirical evidence suggests that the notorious
Soviet practice of “telephone law,” a system through which case
outcomes come from orders issued over the phone by higher-ranking
judges or government officials, remains widespread after more than a
decade of continuous judicial reforms. 8 There are many possible
reasons for this divergence, such as too little political competition, 9 a
low level of political fragmentation within the government, 10 and
judicial passivism. 11
Bridging such a gap seems particularly daunting in the case of
China. Since the launch of the judicial accountability reforms, the
prevailing narrative has been one of deep skepticism, particularly given
China’s huge size and diversity, its deep-rooted practice of judicial
dependency, and the Western origin of the reforms’ design. Through
empirical research, this Article challenges this narrative by
demonstrating that the reforms have indeed made frontline judges
significantly more independent in adjudicating the vast majority of
court cases. It argues that such development is made possible not
because China is becoming more democratic or liberal but—
ironically—because the regime’s increasingly authoritarian nature has
enabled the central reformers to overcome the local embeddedness
facing the reforms’ implementation.
7. MAGGS ET AL., supra note 4, at 159; Kathryn Hendley, The Role of Law, in PUTIN’S
RUSSIA: PAST IMPERFECT, FUTURE UNCERTAIN 83, 85–86 (Stephen K Wegren ed., 2016).
8. Alena Ledeneva, Telephone Justice in Russia, 24 POST-SOVIET AFF. 324, 344 (2008).
9. See, e.g., J Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative
Approach, xxiii J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 741–43 (1994) (claiming that “[i]f rational politicians face
significant odds of being in the minority party . . . they will try to reduce the variance to their
political returns . . . by insulating the judicial system from political control.” But politicians or
parties that “could realistically expect to stay in power indefinitely . . . could rationally elect to
monitor judges instead, and thereby obtain greater control over policy.”); but see Aylin Aydın,
Judicial Independence across Democratic Regimes: Understanding the Varying Impact of
Political Competition, 47 LAW SOC. REV. 105, 105 (2013) (suggesting that “while in advanced
democracies high levels of political competition enhances judicial independence, in developing
democracies political competition significantly hampers the independence of the courts.”).
10. Brinks, supra note 6, at 620 (arguing that in polities where power is more fragmented,
judges are more willing and able to challenge the government, as the latter is less able to retaliate
against the courts.).
11. Hilbink, supra note 6, at 597 (suggesting that an attitude of judicial activism is crucial
to “motivating positive judicial independence” and emboldening “a new cohort of judges to
begin asserting their professional authority against powerful actors”).

2020]

OVERCOMING EMBEDDEDNESS

741

II. ADVANCING JUDICIAL AUTONOMY IN CHINA: MISSION
IMPOSSIBLE?
The risk of divergence between formal rules promoting judicial
autonomy and actual judicial behavior seems particularly significant in
the Chinese context. For decades prior to the reforms, each Chinese
judge had been deeply embedded in the pyramid-like administrative
structure of his or her court. 12 Under this structure, court leaders13 could
control case outcomes through the case-approval system, which
required frontline judges to seek court leaders’ approval for their drafts
of court decisions before the decisions could take effect.14 If a case was
considered legally complex, socially impactful, or politically sensitive,
it would be submitted to an adjudication committee, 15 who would then
make a collective decision regarding the outcome. 16 Besides making
frontline judges dependent upon their superiors, this system of
administrative hierarchy enabled court outsiders such as Communist
Party officials to interfere in cases through their connections to court
leaders. 17
By invoking the concept of embeddedness developed by scholars
such as Polanyi and Granovetter, 18 Ng and He rightfully question
whether the current administration’s centrally imposed judicial
accountability reforms can change such deep-rooted practices in the
short term. They argue that “[d]espite the stated goal of the central
government, institutional culture, local practices, and immediate
concerns on the ground are more determinant in shaping the work of
the grassroots courts. It is unlikely that the new rules that promote
12. Ranks of judges in a typical Chinese court include, in descending order, court
president, vice-presidents, division chiefs of different divisions (e.g. civil, criminal
administrative), vice-division chiefs, and frontline judges.
13. The court president, vice-presidents, division chiefs, and vice-division chiefs are
considered to be “court leaders” in a Chinese court.
14. Ling Li, The “Production” of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and
Decision Making in a One-Party State, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 848, 858–59 (2012).
15. The adjudication committee, which consists of court leaders, is established in every
Chinese court. It is charged with deciding legally complex/controversial, socially impactful, or
politically sensitive cases.
16. KWAI HANG NG & XIN HE, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN
CHINA 91 (2017).
17. Li, supra note 14, at 858–61; Sida Liu, Beyond Global Convergence: Conflicts of
Legitimacy in a Chinese Lower Court, 31 LAW SOC. INQUIRY 75, 94 (2006).
18. See generally Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOCIOL. 481 (1985); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION : THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2d ed., Beacon
2001).
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individual responsibility will have any immediate tangible effects.”19
Indeed, some scholars have argued that the vertical hierarchy,
especially the adjudication committee system, could be advantageous
in many local contexts. For example, Wang and Liu’s empirical work
suggests that the adjudication committees can often help local courts
reach acceptable compromises between political/social and legal
considerations in troublesome cases. 20 Zhu argues that the vertical
hierarchy is necessary to maintain the quality of judicial decisions and
a unified application of law within a single court, which often consists
of hundreds of judges with diverse levels of professional quality. 21 Zhu
criticizes the accountability reform as an impractical plan based not on
actual practice in China but on the foreign and small US federal court
system and predicts that it is likely to fail. 22
Even some of the vertical hierarchy’s much-criticized
disadvantages are likely to make the system more—rather than less—
resilient to change. According to He, the adjudication committee
system provides both individual judges and committee members shelter
from responsibility, as the collective nature of a committee’s decisions
means that no single person can be held accountable in a case gone
wrong. 23 Li argues that Chinese courts’ vertical hierarchy and chain of
command create institutionalized opportunities for corruption by all
participants of the judicial decision-making process. 24 Despite being
harmful to society and the regime as a whole, these factors benefit
judges and court leaders, giving them incentive to resist changes to the
status quo. Taken together, there is good reason to suspect that “judges
will find ways to adapt to the new rules of the game. The
[accountability reforms], as always, will be observed nominally, but

19. NG & HE, supra note 16, at 197.
20. Lungang Wang & Sida Liu, Jiceng Fayuan Shenpan Weiyuanhui Yali Anjian Juece
De Shizheng Yanjiu [An Empirical Study on How the Adjudication Committee in Basic-Level
Courts Makes Decisions on Cases with External Pressure], 1 CHINESE J. L. 80, 96 (2017).
21. Suli Zhu, Jiceng Fayuan Shenpan Weiyuanhui Zhidu De Kaocha Ji Sikao
[Investigation and Thoughts On The Adjudication Committee System In Basic Courts], PEKING
UNIV. L. REV. 320, 336–37 (1998) [hereinafter Zhu, Investigation]; Suli Zhu, Sifa Gaige De
Zhishi Xuqiu [Knowledge Demand of Judicial Reform], LAW MOD. 100, 102–03 (2017)
[hereinafter Zhu, Knowledge].
22. Zhu, Knowledge, supra note 21, at 102–04.
23. Xin He, Black Hole of Responsibility: The Adjudication Committee’s Role in a
Chinese Court, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 681, 706–08 (2012).
24. See Li, supra note 14, at 871.
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whether they will be followed in substance remains an open
question.” 25
These arguments, however, have overlooked the fact that such
embeddedness is part of a multi-layered structure. Indeed, Granovetter
himself has made clear in his seminal work that “the embeddedness
argument is a rather proximate one” between “macrostructural
circumstances” and individuals. 26 As a result, answering any largescale questions about economic and political changes require not only
appreciating the embeddedness in social networks, but also
understanding the “larger cultural and political and economic
phenomena at the macro level of institutions” in which social networks
operate. 27
This is very much true in the case of the Chinese judiciary: just as
judges are deeply embedded in the administrative hierarchy of their
courts, the courts themselves—and the judiciary as a whole—are also
embedded in the broader national political environment. Significant
changes in the national power dynamics will inevitably affect how
court leaders interact with frontline judges, especially when such
interaction involves balancing national mandates with local contexts.
Such a change has indeed taken place in China. Since taking office in
2012, Xi Jinping has drastically consolidated his power by sending
hundreds of thousands of public servants to prison on charges of
corruption—a move that “signaled a zero tolerance approach to noncompliance with central directives.” 28 Such an approach has the
potential to make local courts significantly more compliant about
implementing the centrally mandated judicial reforms despite the deep
administrative embeddedness. Therefore, as Hilbink suggests, a
systematic empirical inquiry is necessary to evaluate the real-world gap
between the formal institutional arrangements that promote judicial
autonomy and actual judicial behavior. 29
Based on in-depth interviews with lawyers and judges from three
Chinese provinces with diverse socioeconomic demographics, this
Article marks the first systematic attempt to empirically describe and
25. NG & HE, supra note 16, at 197.
26. See Granovetter, supra note 18, at 506.
27. Greta Krippner et al., Polanyi Symposium: Aa Cconversation on Eembeddedness, 2
SOCIO-ECON. REV. 109, 116 (2004); see also Granovetter, supra note 18, at 506.
28. Genia Kostka & Jonas Nahm, Central-Local Relations: Recentralization and
Environmental Governance in China, 231 CHINA Q. 567, 568 (2017).
29. Hilbink, supra note 6, at 587–88 (arguing “[p]ositive judicial independence can be
assessed only empirically”).
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analyze the implementation and effect of the judicial accountability
reforms. Partially inspired by the US federal court system, these
reforms promise to strengthen individual judges’ autonomy and
accountability, directly contradicting the traditional emphasis on
collective decision-making in Chinese courts. Defying some of the
predictions mentioned above, this Article finds that the reforms were,
for the most part, earnestly implemented by local courts as assigned by
the central government and the Supreme People’s Court. Moreover, the
reforms have, at least in the short term, increased the autonomy of
judges by enabling them to render judgements without prior approval
from higher-ranking judges and by limiting the use of adjudication
committees. These changes have not only reduced higher-ranking
judges’ influence over most cases, but also weakened the key
mechanisms that powerful outsiders use to interfere in judicial matters.
The findings provide critical information on the recent development of
the Chinese judiciary and compel researchers to reevaluate the role of
the authoritarian state in shaping judicial behavior, especially in light
of its increasingly authoritarian nature. This Article also contributes to
the larger debate about the complex relationship between judiciaries
and nondemocratic regimes.
III. DATA AND METHODS
This Article is based on interviews the Author conducted in China
during summer 2018. Given the diversity of China’s various localities,
the author’s fieldwork spanned three province-level units: Zhejiang, an
affluent unit in the coastal region; Chongqing, a moderately prosperous
unit in the inland region; and Yunnan, a relatively underdeveloped unit
in the inland region. In each, the Author interviewed judges and
lawyers to learn from their different perspectives. To facilitate
meaningful comparisons between the pre- and post-reform courts, the
Author chose to primarily interview judges and lawyers who had joined
their respective practices prior to 2012 (i.e., before Xi Jinping became
president). The Author interviewed judges in various positions ranging
from judicial assistants (technically not judges) to court presidents,
with the majority being frontline judges and division chiefs/vice-chiefs.
Interviewee ages range from mid-twenties to mid-fifties, with roughly
half born after 1980. The interviewed lawyers were associates and
partners from law firms of various sizes, with larger law firms generally
handling cases with larger stakes.
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The composition of the interviews across the province-level units
is as follows. In Zhejiang, fourteen interviews with judges were
conducted in two basic courts and one intermediary court, 30 and fifteen
interviews with lawyers were conducted in one small, one medium, and
one large law firm. 31 In Chongqing, ten interviews were conducted in
two basic courts, and ten interviews were conducted in one small and
one large law firm. In Yunnan, ten interviews were conducted in two
basic courts and one intermediary court, and eight interviews were
conducted in one medium and one large law firm. Altogether, thirtyfour interviews with judges and thirty-three interviews with lawyers
were conducted. Additionally, four courts included in this study were
located outside developed areas. One Chongqing basic court, one
Yunnan basic court, and one Yunnan intermediary court were located
in relatively underdeveloped small cities, and another Chongqing basic
court was located in an impoverished rural county that is a five-hour
drive from Chongqing city. There is a possible urban bias in the sample,
as courts in rural areas are generally considered to be less professional
and more dependent upon local governments. 32
The interviews were semi-structured. The questions mostly
focused on changes in the judiciary during Xi Jinping’s presidency,
especially on the accountability reforms (责任制). Typical questions
include:
1. What is your position in the court (or law firm)? What is your
practice area?
2. When did you start working here? Did you have other legal
experiences before joining?
3. What measures have been taken with regard to the
accountability reforms (责任制), such as “the one who handles the
case will decide” (审理者裁判) and “the one who decides will be
accountable” (裁判者负责)?

30. China has a four-level court system: the Supreme Court, high courts, intermediary
courts, and basic courts. The basic courts are the courts of the first instance for most civil,
criminal, and administrative cases. The jurisdiction of a basic court normally consists of a single
town or municipal district. An intermediary court sits at the prefecture or municipality level, and
handles appellate cases from the basic courts within its jurisdiction. It also serves as a court of
first instance for cases that meet certain statutory threshold.
31. In the Chinese context, a small law firm normally employs no more than 20 to 30
attorneys and has only a single office. A big firm employs a minimum of 100 attorneys and has
offices across multiple provinces. Medium firms are the ones in between the two extremes.
32. See NG & HE, supra note 16, at 193.
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4. What do you think are the effects of the accountability
reforms?
5. How did the accountability reforms affect the role of external
influences on court cases?

This list of questions was for the Author’s reference only. The
Author encouraged interviewees to speak freely on any related topics
that they had deep knowledge about or were interested in discussing,
and the Author sometimes asked follow-up questions not included on
the list. Interviews with judges lasted around thirty to seventy-five
minutes, and interviews with lawyers lasted around twenty to forty
minutes.
There are two main challenges in using interviews to evaluate the
judicial reforms. First, the Xi Jinping administration considers the
reforms an important part of its domestic policy. 33 As a result, court
officials are wary of producing “negative publicity” for the reforms that
could be tracked to a specific court. Second, questions about external
influences can potentially touch upon wrongdoing by interviewees or
their colleagues. Under these circumstances, it is unreasonable to
expect interviewees to be completely forthcoming about these issues
even if guaranteed anonymity.
Several steps were taken to address these challenges. First, to
protect not only the identities of the interviewed individuals but also
the entities in which the interviews took place, interviewees and
contacts were promised that the names of their cities and counties
would not be mentioned in publications. This level of confidentiality
facilitated the process of arranging interviews and encouraged more
candid discussions. Second, in addition to interviewing judges, the
author interviewed lawyers, who offered a somewhat more objective
and candid perspective on the impacts of the reforms. Third, all
interviews were arranged through scholars who worked at universities
in the interviewees’ respective provinces and had long-term
connections with the courts and law firms where the interviews were
conducted. The connection and trust between the scholars and the
entities helped ease the latter’s fear of negative publicity. However, as
the interviewees were chosen by the entities to which they belonged,
there is an inherent risk that the entities—especially the courts—picked
individuals with views they deemed politically safe. Nonetheless, given
33. Jacques Delisle, Law in the China Model 2.0: Legality, Developmentalism and
Leninism under Xi Jinping, 26 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 68, 69 (2017).
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that random sampling was not a feasible option, the abovementioned
measures were the best available to the Author in obtaining information
from as many interviewees as possible.
To preserve anonymity, the interviewees’ names have been coded
as two letters and two digits (e.g., JA01 or LA01) according to the
following method. The first letter (J or L) denotes judge or lawyer,
representing the occupation of the interviewee. The second letter is a
province-level unit code representing the location of the interview
(Zhejiang: A, Chongqing: B, Yunnan: C). The digits that follow
indicate the interview number.
IV. POLICY BACKGROUND
The judicial accountability reforms are part of a comprehensive
judicial reform launched by the Xi Jinping administration since 2013.34
In 2013, the third plenum of the 18th Communist Party (“CCP”)
Central Committee issued a decision laying out a broad roadmap for
judicial reforms. 35 This blueprint was reconfirmed and elaborated
during the fourth plenum of the CCP Central Committee in 2014, the
first high-profile meeting dedicated to “governing the country
according to the law.” 36 In June 2014, the Central Leading Group for
Comprehensively Deepening Reform, a Party body headed by Xi
Jinping, officially authorized the implementation of the reforms in six
provinces (these were expanded to the remaining provinces in 2015).37
While the Party was in charge of the reforms, much of the actual design
34. Besides the judicial accountability reforms, which primarily concern the relationship
between frontline judges and the court leaders, the overall judicial reform also includes measures
addressing the courts’ dependency on local governments (“the judicial centralization reforms”)
and issues involving the judicial professionalism (“the judicial personnel reforms”). For a
detailed description on these reforms, see Yueduan Wang, “Detaching” Courts From Local
Politics? Assessing Judicial Centralization Reforms In China (under review) (on file with
author); Yueduan Wang, Reevaluating “Countermeasure from Below”: Evidences from Judicial
Personnel Reforms, Peking U. L. J. (forthcoming 2020).
35. Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Decision of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning
Comprehensively
Deepening
the
Reform,
CHINA.ORG.CN
(2014),
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602_9.htm
[https://perma.cc/VS7B-QGXF] (last visited Oct. 3, 2018).
36. Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, supra note 5.
37. Weihan Yang, Zhongyang Jueding Zai Shanghai Guangdong Deng Liu Shengshi
Shidian Sifa Gaige [The Party Center Decides To Test Judicial Reform In Guangdong And
Other Five Provinces], CAIXIN.COM (June 16, 2014, 7:59 AM), http://china.caixin.com/201406-16/100690795.html [https://perma.cc/SRQ7-K4S5].
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and implementation work was entrusted to the Supreme People’s Court
and its Leadership Group for Judicial Reforms, which was headed by
Court President Zhou Qiang. 38 It was also stipulated that any “pilot
programs” related to the judicial reforms implemented by the
provincial high courts must be first approved by the Court or the central
government, 39 thus ensuring that reform designs were uniform and
centralized. In 2015, the Court promulgated the Opinions on
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform of People’s Courts, which
laid out specific reform measures for the entire judiciary. 40 These
include a series of reforms on the “judicial accountability system” (or
“the accountability reforms”). 41
The principle goal of the accountability reforms is to ensure that
the “one who tries the case shall have the power to decide the case and
be responsible for his decision.” 42 Specifically, these reforms promise
to: (1) deprive court leaders of the power to review and sign court
opinions drafted by frontline judges, (2) substantially reduce the use of
adjudication committees, (3) establish “conferences of professional
judges” that provide frontline judges with non-binding advice on the
application of law, (4) establish a system that records “interference with
cases by court insiders,” and (5) develop a system of “lifelong
accountability for the quality of cases” that holds judges accountable
for cases they adjudicate. 43
Interestingly, despite the regime’s official rejection of Western
ideology, the judicial reforms seem to have deep Western – indeed,
American – roots. Judges reported during their interviews that they
were told these reforms were inspired by the US federal court system.
For example, an intermediary court judge shared that he learned during
a meeting with officials from the Supreme People’s Court that “there
were a bunch of people who came back from the US in the Office of
38. SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, ZHONGGUO FAYUAN DE SIFA GAIGE: 20132018 [JUDICIAL REFORM OF CHINESE COURTS: 2013-2018] 7 (2019).
39. Id. at 7.
40. Supreme People’s Court of China, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Quanmian
Shenhua Renmin Fayuan Gaige De Yijian [Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on
Comprehensive Deepening of Reform of People’s Courts], CHINACOURT.ORG (Feb. 4, 2015),
https://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2015/02/id/148096.shtml
[https://perma.cc/SP6GPY5T] (last visited Oct. 3, 2018).
41. Id.
42. SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, ZHONGGUO FAYUAN DE SIFA GAIGE: 20132016 [JUDICIAL REFORM OF CHINESE COURTS: 2013-2016] 30 (2017).
43. See id. at 30–33.
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Judicial Reforms. 44 They made the current plan for judicial reforms
mainly based upon the US federal court system.” 45 While there is no
official account to validate this statement, 46 it does offer a plausible
hypothesis for why China has chosen to move from its traditional
emphasis on collective decision-making to emphasizing the power and
responsibility of individual judges, 47 an approach more commonly
associated with Anglo-American legal systems. 48 Such connection is
especially ironic given Chief Justice Zhou Qiang—the head of the
Chinese judiciary and the public face of the recent judicial reforms—
publicly announced in the midst of the reforms that “We should
resolutely resist erroneous influence from the West: ‘constitutional
democracy,’ ‘separation of powers’ and ‘independence of the
judiciary.’ We must make clear our stand and dare to show the
sword.” 49 However, such divergence between political rhetoric and
actual policies may have been a necessary tactic, as demonstration of
political loyalty is likely a prerequisite for the Party’s support of the
reforms, especially since the reforms have sensitive Western origins. 50

44. For example, He Fan, one of chief authors of the Supreme Court’s plan on the judicial
reforms, have translated multiple books on the US federal court system and even drafted a book
named Essays on US Supreme Court. See Wei Gao & Hua Qin, Supreme People’s Court
Comrade He Fan’s Deeds, CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015, 5:23 PM),
http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n/2015/0915/c399092-27588729.html [https://perma.cc/9WGXFQUX].
45. Interview with JC10, Judge, Intermediary People’s Court, in Yunnan, China (July 13,
2018).
46. Several Chinese legal scholars with connections with the Supreme People’s Court
also confirmed this connection between the judicial reforms and US federal court system during
conversation with the author.
47. See Ray Worthy Campbell & Fu Yulin, Moving target: the regulation of judges in
China’s rapidly evolving legal system, in REGULATING JUDGES 105, 105, 114–15 (Richard
Devlin & Adam Dodek eds., 2016).
48. See, e.g.,. Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of
Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 432 (1966); Michael Kirby, Judicial dissent - common
law and civil law traditions, 123 LAW Q. REV. 379 (2007).
49. Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independent Judiciary, and
Reformers
Wince,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
18,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/asia/china-chief-justice-courts-zhou-qiang.html
[https://perma.cc/DUR4-5XQG].
50. See Benjamin L Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q. 620,
627 (2007), https://www.jstor.org/stable/20192809?seq=1#metadata [https://perma.cc/E3VH279H] (info tab contents) (arguing that judicial reforms in China “may be possible precisely
because the courts are not a challenge to Party authority.”).
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY REFORMS

A. The Reform Measures and Their Implementation
The judicial accountability reforms generally aim to increase the
independence of individual judges or judge panels from their superiors
in the courts. Prior to the reforms, most court opinions had to be cosigned by either a department division chief or one of the court
presidents/vice-presidents. Cases with higher stakes often went to
adjudication committees, which consist mostly of court leaders. Li
identifies this mechanism as one of the key components of the
systematic corruption that once characterized Chinese courts because
it “allow[ed] corrupt [court leaders] to control the outcome of a much
greater number of cases of interest.” 51
Formally, the reforms have completely eliminated this case
approval system. In the words of the Supreme Court, the reforms
“revoked the system of asking for instructions and examination and
approval level by level [and] established [in its place] the system that
one who tries a case shall have the power to decide the case and be
responsible for his decision.” 52 Prior to the reform, it was standard
practice in most courts to have either a division chief or a
president/vice-president co-sign an opinion before it became effective.
One judge described the approval system in his court prior to the
reforms this way: “Before the reform, all cases must be approved by
division chiefs or president/vice presidents. Initially, all cases must go
through both a division chief and a president/vice-president. Later,
simple cases needed to be approved by division chiefs, and other cases
were approved by vice-presidents or a full-time member of the
judiciary committee.” 53 Normally, an opinion could not be issued
without going through a similar approval process. Under the new
reforms, however, a court opinion becomes effective immediately after
it is signed by the judge or the judicial panel that tried the case. 54 In
effect, the new system closes the primary institutional channel through
which court leadership previously influenced the outcomes of
51. Li, supra note 14, at 860.
52. SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40, at 30.
53. Interview with JC03, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Yunnan, China (July 10, 2018).
54. See, e.g., Interview with JA01, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June
6, 2018); Interview with JC02, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Yunnan, China (July 10, 2018).
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individual cases. As this Article discusses later, court leaders can still
use informal means to convey their preferences in important cases
under the new system, but the elimination of the formal approval
system has made it harder—and thus less worthwhile—for leaders to
interfere with their subordinates’ cases under most circumstances.
The accountability reforms have also limited the scope of the
adjudication committees’ review of cases. According to the Supreme
Court, “[i]n addition to the cases required by the law and the major and
complicated cases involving foreign affairs, security and social
stability of the State, the adjudication committees shall focus on the
application of law in major, difficult, and complicated cases.” 55 In other
words, the adjudication committees are generally not supposed to
interfere with case fact-finding unless a case involves “foreign affairs,
security and social stability of the State.” 56 It also means that the
adjudication committees are not supposed to take a case simply because
it involves large sums of money. In 2019, the Court stated that as a
result of the reform, “the number of cases submitted to the judicial
committees in the people’s courts at all levels for discussion has
decreased significantly,” sometimes by more than forty percent.57
Many interviewed judges confirmed that adjudication committees are
indeed utilized much less frequently since the reforms. 58 For example,
one criminal judge said: “the adjudication committee now rarely
discusses criminal cases. In the past, many cases had to be reported to
the adjudication committee. Now, every year, there are only singledigit [numbers of cases reported].” 59 Similarly, a court leader reported:
The functioning of the adjudication committee indeed changed a
lot . . . The number of cases handled by the adjudication
committee has been significantly reduced. Before the reform,
whenever judges were unsure about a case, they would bring it to
the adjudication committee. Now, in principle, the case handlers
are responsible for the cases themselves . . . Nowadays the
adjudication committee only focuses on difficult matters of law. In
55. SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40, at 32.
56. Id. at 32.
57. SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40, at 81.
58. See, e.g., Interview with JA05, Staff of the Political Department, Basic People’s
Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 6, 2018); Interview with JB06, Judge and Vice Division chief
of the 1st Civil Division, Basic People’s Court, in Chongqing, China (June 27, 2018); Interview
with JC06, Judge and Member of the Adjudication Committee, Basic People’s Court, in Yunnan,
China (July 11, 2018).
59. Interview with JC03, supra note 53.

752

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:4

the past, difficult matters of fact could also come to the
committee . . . The problems in most cases are matters of fact, so
this also blocked a large number [of cases from entering the
adjudication committee]. 60

To compensate for the elimination of the approval process and the
reduced function of the adjudication committees, many courts have
established so-called “conferences of professional judges” (专业法官
会议). The function of these conferences include “provid[ing] the
collegiate panels with advice on correct application of law and opinions
for their reference” and “filt[ering] the cases submitted to the
adjudication committee.” 61 A court usually has multiple conferences
on various subjects, with civil, criminal, and administrative law each
having its own conference. 62 Each conference includes judges not only
within the relevant departments, but also from other departments that
focus on a related subject. 63 For example, administrative law judges
might be included in the civil law conference, as civil disputes can
involve governmental actions. 64 The judges or judicial panels have the
power to decide whether to submit a case to the judicial conference.
When they do, it is mostly because a case is too complex or the judges
on the panel disagree on the outcome. The conference can then give its
opinions, but such opinions are advisory and non-binding—the judges
or judicial panels that submit the cases are, at least in theory, free to
take or reject the conference’s opinions and remain fully accountable
for these cases. 65 The voluntary nature of the conferences has led to
complaints that some bold judges will refuse to submit complex cases
to the conferences, which could increase the number of erroneous
decisions. 66
Although the Supreme Court has called for establishing
conferences of professional judges, the implementation does not seem
to be universal. Those judges who reported frequent utilization of the
60. Interview with JA06, Judge and Director of the Trial Administration Office, Basic
People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 7, 2018).
61. SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40, at 31–32.
62. Interview with JA07, Judge and Vice Division chief of 2nd Civil Division, Basic
People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 7, 2018).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id.; Interview with JA09, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 9,
2018).
66. Interview with JB04, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Chongqing, China (June 22,
2018); Interview with JB09, Judge and Division Chief of Small-Subject Division, Basic People’s
Court, in Chongqing, China (June 27, 2018).
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system generally consider it quite useful. 67 They expressed that the
conferences not only provide professional advice to individual judges
on difficult cases, but also help relieve the pressure of important or
controversial cases. 68 Some courts utilize the formal conference
infrequently due to the difficulty of assembling large numbers of judges
from multiple departments. 69 Instead, these courts set up informal
conferences consisting of judges within a single department, which
perform roughly the same function as the formal conferences.70
Regardless of the conference formalities, the judges confirmed that
conference recommendations are always advisory and that judges
themselves remain fully accountable for their cases. 71
The reforms have also attempted to strengthen the independence
of judges by introducing “the system of recording and affixing
responsibilities for interference with cases by insiders of judicial
organs.” 72 Each court is tasked with establishing a special database
within the case management platform. 73 Judges are required to record
any “interference with cases by insiders . . . outside the legal
procedures or relevant working procedures,” 74 including the names of
those interfering and the specific nature of the interference. Not a single
judge interviewed, however, reported actually using this system or
knowing of a colleague who had. But several judges observed that the
mere existence of the system makes a difference. As one judge
explained:
Although I do not know anyone who actually recorded [any
interference], this mechanism functions as an invisible claw. If a
leader wants to interfere, he will have to think twice because it is
the right of the judge to record. If the judge is determined to record,
then no one can stop him or her. 75

With increased power comes increased accountability, at least in
theory. The Supreme Court states that “a judge shall be responsible for
67. E.g. Interview with JA07, supra note 62; Interview with JA08, Judge, Basic People’s
Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 7, 2018).
68. Interview with JA07, supra note 62.
69. Interview with JB01, Judge and Director of the Research Office, Basic People’s
Court, in Chongqing, China (June 22, 2018); Interview with JC06, supra note 58.
70. Interview with JB01, supra note 69; Interview with JC02, supra note 54.
71. Interview with JB01, supra note 69.
72. SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40, at 33.
73. Id. at 33.
74. Id.
75. Interview with JA07, supra note 62.
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his/her performance of duties of adjudication and for the quality of
cases handled by him/her for life.” 76 However, during the interviews,
judges indicated that with the exception of several high-profile
wrongful convictions in criminal cases, there are no concrete policies
setting exactly how to measure the quality of cases or how a judge will
be held responsible for his or her performance. 77 That being said, for
some (but not all) judges, the mere term lifelong accountability and the
fact that they can no longer share accountability with their superiors
add pressure. 78 One judge complained: “After the lifelong
[accountability] system, judges universally reported that [we feel] more
responsibility for [our] cases. In the past, [we] had insomnia. Now, [we]
have anxiety.” 79
B. Evaluating the Reforms: Views from Judges and Lawyers
The judges almost unanimously recognized that the accountability
reforms empower them to handle their cases more independently,
particularly due to the elimination of the case approval system. Many
judges characterized their post-reform role as “independent judging,”80
“complete independent handling of cases,” 81 “personal judging,” 82 or
“the last gate.” 83 One criminal law judge described the difference like
this:
In criminal cases, there used to be . . . outside interferences. After
the reforms . . . interference by leaders is basically a non-issue. I
personally have never encountered [any interference] after the
judicial reforms. The main reason is that now the presiding judges
themselves are the ones who decide. 84

Even the less optimistic judges recognized that the reforms have made
them more independent. For example, one judge said:

76. SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40.
77. Interview with JA08, supra note 67.
78. E.g. Interview with JA01, supra note 54; Interview with JA07, supra note 62;
Interview with JB03, Judge and Director of the Trial Administration Office, Basic People’s
Court, in Chongqing, China (June 22, 2018).
79. Interview with JA05, supra note 58.
80. Interview with JA01, supra note 54.
81. Interview with JA03, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 6, 2018).
82. Interview with JB07, Judge and Division Head of 1st Civil Division, Basic People’s
Court, in Chongqing, China (June 27, 2018).
83. Interview with JC02, supra note 54.
84. Interview with JC03, supra note 53.
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It is hard to avoid all external interference. But now the person
making the final decision is different. In the past, if the division
chief did not agree, he or she could refuse to sign on the opinion.
Now [the division chief] can only come to speak [with the
presiding judge]. This is a matter of degree, but things are indeed
better than before. 85

Some judges from more developed regions, however, stated that the
elimination of the approval process has had limited impact because
they rarely encountered interference from superiors before the
reform. 86 One judge from a big-city court explained: “The rule-of-law
environment is relatively good in our place . . . There have been few
instances of leaders interfering with cases.” 87
Like the judges, most of the interviewed lawyers said that the
reforms have generally made judges more autonomous in adjudicating
cases. Among the thirty lawyers who were asked to comment on the
effect of the accountability reforms, twenty-four answered that the
reforms have resulted in greater judicial independence and less external
influence on their cases, 88 and five answered that there had been little
or no difference and that external influence remained a problem. 89 One
criminal lawyer from Zhejiang answered that she felt that criminal law
cases, “unlike in civil law [cases],” had not been seriously influenced
by external factors since the early 2000s. 90
Many lawyers pointed to the elimination of the approval process
as the most important factor contributing to increased independence.
Specifically, they mentioned that (1) eliminating the approval process
has made it much harder for court leaders to intercede in cases and (2)
judges are less willing than before to let improper requests influence

85. Interview with JB03, supra note 78.
86. Interview with JA04, Judge and Vice Division Chief of the Administrative Division,
Basic People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 6, 2018); Interview with JC07, Judge, Basic
People’s Court, in Yunnan, China (July 11, 2018).
87. Interview with JA07, supra note 62.
88. Lawyers who responded this way include: LA02, LA03, LA05, LA06, LA07, LA08,
LA09, LA10, LA11, LA13, LA14, LB05, LB06, LB07, LB08, LB09, LB10, LC01, LC02, LC04,
LC05, LC06, LC07, LC08.
89. Lawyer who responded this way include: LB01, LB02, LB03, LB04, LC03.
90. Interview with LA12, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Zhejiang, China (June 5,
2018). She said: “When I first became a lawyer in the 1990s, there were many meal gatherings
with judges. Back then, restaurants just started to pop up, and the management [of judicial
corruption] was not very strict. After 2000, there were a series of ‘red alerts’ aimed at regulating
the relationship between judges and lawyers, and we began to become more ‘formal.’”
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their opinions because they are now fully accountable. One lawyer’s
words are especially representative:
[The accountability reform] was helpful in reducing outside
interference. Before the reforms, some cases had few disputes and
the judges agreed with our opinions. But when the decisions were
rendered, they turned out to be the complete opposite and were
totally unexpected. Such [cases] were definitely problematic. In
the past few years, such [a] situation has become very rare. After
the reforms, there were very few requests and little interference
from above . . . When I first entered the profession [around 2011],
lawyers did not rely on their skills, but rather relied on their
guanxi91 with the courts. Now there are significantly fewer such
lawyers, and those left are having a hard time. That path has
closed. Guanxi may still allow you to learn about the progress of
your cases, but it cannot affect the [judges’] views of the facts and
the final decisions. 92

Another lawyer elaborated on how the reforms have influenced judges’
independence from superiors:
Nowadays, [court] leaders interfere less frequently because [such
interferences] are not as useful as before. After the reforms, even
if they do interfere, the judges can still decide the cases themselves
because they no longer need the leaders’ signatures to render
decisions . . . Whatever the leaders do, the judges will normally
just pay some lip service to give face to the leaders and decide the
cases in the way they should be decided. After all, there is the
system of lifelong accountability—the responsibility is on the
judges themselves. 93

The lawyers who expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of
the reforms in reducing external influence mostly focused on the fact
that court leaders maintain strong informal influence over frontline

91. Guanxi is the pinyin Romanization of the Chinese word 关系, meaning “connection”
or “relationship.” It means, among many things, the personal relationship cultivated by an
individual with other individuals, especially with persons of power. For a more detailed
discussion on guanxi and judicial decision-making in China, see Xin He & Kwai Hang Ng, “It
Must Be Rock Strong!”: Guanxi’s Impact on Judicial Decision Making in China, 65 AM. J.
COMP. LAW 841 (2017).
92. Interview with LC08, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Yunnan, China (July 12,
2018).
93. Interview with LA13, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Zhejiang, China (June 5,
2018).
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judges. 94 Such informal influence is largely rooted in the court leaders’
power over their subordinates’ promotions. 95 However, these lawyers
recognized that this form of informal interference is reserved for
exceptionally large cases, which constitute a small fraction of the cases
handled by the courts. As one lawyer explained:
At this point, the impact of the accountability reforms still does
not seem obvious. The influence of external factors is still very
significant. The saying goes that “small cases depend on law, midsized cases depend on guanxi, and large cases depend on
politics” . . . However, after the reforms, if the judge insists on a
specific result, then the leaders have no way to force him or her to
change the decision. But such insistence will be disadvantageous
to him/her in the longer term, as it will negatively affect his/her
guanxi with the leaders. 96

Some lawyers painted a more balanced picture of the situation based
on their experiences with regular and large cases. One said:
The accountability reforms had a very large impact on the judges.
In the past, those from above often interceded in cases. Now, even
if [they] intercede, the judges will be much more careful, as they
are now accountable [for the cases] themselves . . . If the value of
the subject matter is large, there will still be interference. In the
past, there was interference, no matter [how] large or small [the
case]. 97

Another lawyer reported:
After the accountability reforms, there are fewer external factors
[in cases] . . . But there are still problems in large cases . . .
Sometimes, in order to deal with these situations, we will also find
someone [to intercede on behalf of our client]. But normally, such
situations will only happen in large cases, not in cases involving
only hundreds of thousands or a couple million [RMBs]. 98

94. See e.g., Interview with LB03, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China
(June 20, 2018); Interview with LB04, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China
(June 20, 2018).
95. See Interview with LB01, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China (June
20, 2018); Interview with LB04, supra note 94.
96. Interview with LB04, supra note 94.
97. Interview with LB07, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China (June
28, 2018).
98. Interview with LB09, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China (June
28, 2018).
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Notably, even in some large cases, judges are increasingly unwilling to
violate clear-cut rules or procedures, as the reforms have made them
personally accountable for such behaviors. For example, one
administrative law lawyer explained:
In administrative cases, even though the government will still try
to influence the court, it is obviously less useful than before . . .
For example, I do a lot of house demolition cases. Nowadays, if
there are any procedural defects in the government’s demolition
process, then the court will not help the government . . . After all,
judges are now accountable for their own cases, and the cases are
uploaded online. 99

On the other hand, some lawyers expressed concern that the
increased discretion of individual judges makes it more likely that the
judges themselves—rather than their superiors—will be influenced by
external factors. For example, one lawyer said: “Now the judge himself
or herself makes the final decision. In the past, [we] needed to co-opt
the division chiefs and the presidents. Now, some judges might say that
‘all you need to do is co-opt me.’ There is a problem of too much
power.” 100 Among the thirty interviewed lawyers, eight mentioned this
as a concern, but six of those nonetheless maintained that the reforms
have made a positive change to the overall impartiality of the judiciary.
One lawyer stated: “In terms of independence, [the reforms] only
reduce interference from superiors but cannot completely eliminate
[the judges’] personal connections with the outside world. But overall,
there is an improvement compared to before the reforms.” 101 In
addition, several lawyers also mentioned that young judges tend to be
more “formal,” “just,” and “valuing of the law” compared to their
senior counterparts. 102 Before the reforms, the opinions produced by
these junior judges were subjected to the approval of their superiors,
who were mostly senior judges. With the removal of the approval
system, younger judges have reaped the substantial benefits of
individual empowerment, which reduces the prevalence of interference
by court superiors.
99. Interview with LB07, supra note 97.
100. Interview with LC01, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Yunnan, China (July 9,
2018).
101. Interview with LA08, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Zhejiang, China (June
4, 2018).
102. See, e.g., Interview with LB09, supra note 98; Interview with LB10, Partner,
Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China (June 28, 2018).
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The accountability system has also created some problems with
the quality of court opinions. Some judges appreciated the old case
approval system because it functioned as a safeguard, whereby the
professionally more capable court leaders would check opinions for
potential errors or deficiencies. 103 Some young judges in particular
miss the approval system, as they often lack the experience and
confidence to decide more complex or consequential cases on their
own. 104 Indeed, some judges complained that the abolition of the
approval system has resulted in more “erroneous” cases. For example,
one intermediary court judge said:
Particularly for us intermediary courts, the bad thing [about the
accountability reforms] is that we are increasingly overruling or
reversing [basic court decisions], which rarely happened in the
past. The main thing is that young judges have little experience . . .
In the past, there were people who could check [their opinions], so
[young judges] were less likely to make mistakes. 105

Lawyers also expressed concerns about the reforms’ impact on the
quality of judges’ decisions. Some lawyers conveyed that the new
system gives too much discretion to judges with less experience or
capability. One lawyer complained:
Nowadays, [judges] are very powerful, so the judges’ professional
qualities need to be relatively high. For example, many young
judges have never married themselves, but are deciding divorce
cases by themselves. [They] have no idea about the messy and
complicated things in a marriage, so it is hard for them to
understand the circumstances of such cases. 106

Another echoed this sentiment:
Nowadays, there are too many court opinions that simply lack
common sense. This is all because the judges are now deciding
[cases] by themselves. We have now secured the judges’
independence in deciding cases but not their competences in legal
skills. This is because whether one can join the judge quota
depends on a lot of factors, not just on the candidate’s legal skills.
In the past, we still had the presidents and division chiefs to ensure
103.
104.
105.
8, 2018).
106.
5, 2018).

Interview with JB09, supra note 66.
Interview with JA09, supra note 65.
Interview with JA12, Judge, Intermediary People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June
Interview with LA11, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Zhejiang, China (June
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the quality [of court opinions]. Now, too many cases are arbitrarily
decided. 107

The old approval system also helped the courts mitigate the
problem of inconsistent rulings because the division chiefs and
presidents/vice-presidents would try to ensure that similar cases
produced similar results across different judges in the same court.108
One lawyer said:
Because judges’ professional levels vary a lot, personal
accountability will lead to a severe problem of “similar cases
treated differently.” There was one court that decided similar
situations in four different ways, making our predictions of case
results very difficult. In general, the independent judgment
[system] has made judges too powerful. 109

VI. OVERCOMING LOCAL EMBEDDEDNESS
How do the reforms overcome judges’ deep-rooted embeddedness
in the administrative hierarchy? To answer this question, one must first
answer another: why do local contexts matter in the first place? In other
words, why can’t the central government always get its preferred
policies implemented regardless of local resistances? The explanation
lies in the multi-layered nature of the system: just as a judge is
embedded in the court’s administrative hierarchy, that court is situated
in the broader political dynamic that includes many local and central
actors. From the start of Reform and Opening in the late 1970s through
early 2010, the state of Chinese politics was characterized by two
general features: horizontally, political power in the center was often
shared by rivaling factions, each with its own power bases and spheres
of influence in different localities or bureaucracies; 110 and vertically,
economic and political power was decentralized to such extent that
some scholars even termed the structure “federalism, China style” or

107. Interview with LC07, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Yunnan, China (July 12,
2018).
108. E.g. Interview with JA04, supra note 86; Interview with JC03, supra note 53.
109. Interview with LA08, supra note 101.
110. For a more detailed discussion about factional dynamic in China, see VICTOR C
SHIH, FACTIONS AND FINANCE IN CHINA : ELITE CONFLICT AND INFLATION (2008); CHENG LI,
CHINESE POLITICS IN THE XI JINPING ERA: REASSESSING COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP (2016);
Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Did Government Decentralization Cause China’s Economic
Miracle?, 58 WORLD POL. 505 (2006).
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“de facto federalism.” 111 Such fragmentation of authority unavoidably
led to fragmentation in policy implementation. The popular phrase
“where there is a policy from above, there is a countermeasure from
below” (上有政策，下有对策) accurately captures the disjointed
decision-making of the central and local governments during this
period. 112 Under such “fragmented authoritarianism,” 113 it would be
almost guaranteed that the judicial accountability reforms would be
implemented unevenly across China, with many courts only nominally
observing the reform measures.
However, Xi Jinping’s surprisingly effective power consolidation
changed the rules of the game, resulting in the unexpectedly earnest
implementation of these reforms. After taking power in late 2012, Xi
surprised almost all observers by launching the largest anti-corruption
campaign in the People’s Republic’s history. Between 2013 and 2016,
over 200,000 officials were indicted on corruption-related charges, and
over 180,000 were tried and convicted. 114 Among the convicts were
both tigers and flies, terms respectively referring to Xi’s powerful
factional rivals in the center and low-level public servants in the
localities. 115 The move effectively put an end to the decades-old
political fragmentation of China’s authoritarian system, as officials
across China have been subdued by the continuing campaign, “fearful
lest the monitoring eye of Beijing come scrutinizing past abuses of
power.” 116 The anti-corruption crackdown significantly reduced local
officials’ powers and discretion and signaled that the center would no
111. See Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian & Barry R Weingast, Federalism, Chinese
Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50 (1995);
YONGNIAN ZHENG, DE FACTO FEDERALISM IN CHINA : REFORMS AND DYNAMICS OF
CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS (2007).
112. See Diana Fu, Fragmented Control: Governing Contentious Labor Organizations
in China, 30 GOVERNANCE 445, 446 (2017) (arguing Chinese politics was “characterized by
disjointed decision making below the top level of authority and ‘deep jurisdictional cleavages’
between bureaucracies”); see also KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY
MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES (1988).
113. Fu, supra note 112, at 446; see also LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 112.
114. Andrew Wedeman, China’s Corruption Crackdown: War Without End?, 116 CURR.
HIST. 210, 210 (2017).
115. Id. at 212–13; Tania Branigan, Xi Jinping vows to fight ‘“tigers’“ and ‘“flies’“ in
anti-corruption
drive
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
22,
2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/22/xi-jinping-tigers-flies-corruption
[https://perma.cc/B6XY-D7LD].
116. John A. Donaldson, China’s Administrative Hierarchy, in ASSESSING THE
BALANCE OF POWER IN CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS IN CHINA 105, 127 (John A. Donaldson
ed., 2017).
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longer tolerate non-compliance with its key priorities. 117 For example,
local governments once had final say in environmental policies, often
prioritizing economic development over environmental goals; in recent
years, however, the central government has significantly centralized
the enforcement mechanisms and begun to hold local officials
criminally liable for oversights, resulting in “considerable
improvements in many domains such as air pollution control,
renewable energies and electric vehicles.” 118
As part of this trend, local courts have little choice but to comply
with the judicial reform plans repeatedly endorsed by the central
government and Xi Jinping himself. During the interviews, multiple
judges confirmed that there was heavy political pressure from higher
courts and the central government to implement the judicial reform
plans in a timely and faithful manner, with no regard to oppositions
from local court leaders. 119 The implementation of the accountability
reforms is by no means alone in this sense. Besides the judicial reforms,
the Xi Jinping administration also launched a campaign to promote the
autonomy of the courts vis-à-vis the local governments and Party
apparatuses, which is another embeddedness issue that has been
haunting the Chinese judiciary for decades. 120 According to
interviewed judges and lawyers, although the dependency problem is
far from being solved, local officials’ willingness to intervene in court
cases has decreased considerably since 2013 due to the fear of “getting
caught.” 121 One judge even reported that a local officer was removed
from his position for exerting pressure on the court during an

117. Kostka & Nahm, supra note 28, at 568; see also Donaldson, supra note 116, at 126.
118. Genia Kostka & Chunman Zhang, Tightening the Grip: Environmental Governance
under Xi Jinping, 27 ENVTL. POL. 769, 773–78 (2018).
119. See, e.g., Interview with JA10, Judge & Div. Chief of 1st Civil Division, Basic
People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 7, 2018); Interview with JC10, supra note 45.
120. Scholars have generally found the Chinese courts to be highly dependent upon local
government and local Party apparatus, at least prior to the launching of the recent judicial
reforms. For a more detailed analysis about the issue, see Ting Gong, Dependent Judiciary and
Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary China, 4 CHINA REV. 33 (2004);
Xin He, Maintaining Stability by Law: Protest‐Supported Housing Demolition Litigation and
Social Change in China, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 849, 859 (2014); Ling Li, The Chinese
Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judicial Dependence in China , 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 37,
71 (2016); Suli Zhu, Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 533,
540-41 (2007); Wang, supra note 34.
121. See e.g., Interview with LC06, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Yunnan, China
(July 12, 2018); Interview with JC09, Judge & Div. Chief of the Admin. Div., Basic People’s
Court, in Yunnan, China (July 11, 2018).
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administrative litigation involving his agency. 122 Indeed, many judges
complained that the local governments’ increasing unwillingness to
actively get involved in socially impactful cases (such as cases
involving housing demolition) is hurting the courts’ ability to mitigate
the social conflicts underlying these cases. 123
Such developments echo the view that embeddedness analysis is
only the intermediate level in a multi-layered structure. According to
Granovetter, embeddedness in social networks serves as a “middle
ground between larger cultural and political and economic phenomena
at the macro level of institutions and individuals at the other side . . .
through which all these connections were flowing back and forth.”124
Therefore, it is impossible to accurately predict the result of large-scale
social or political projects without paying sufficient attention to
changes on the macroscopic level. Some of the more pessimistic views
about the reforms overemphasize social networks while overlooking
the political macrostructure: Xi Jinping administration’s power
consolidation has put tremendous political pressure on local courts to
earnestly carry out central directives, which leads to the steadfast
implementation of the judicial reform plans. This causal link perfectly
illustrates Granovetter’s point on embeddedness: broad political
changes can have dramatic effects on the operations of local social
networks, and consequently on the behaviors of individuals embedded
in them.
VII. CONCLUSION
Drawing on evidence from fieldwork in courts and law firms, this
Article examines the implementation and impact of the judicial
accountability reforms under Xi Jinping. For the most part, these
reforms were implemented across the regions investigated, and they
have largely eliminated the case approval system, under which a court
opinion drafted by a judge or judicial panel must be co-signed by a
court leader before taking effect. As part of the reforms, the
adjudication committees, which consist of court leaders and were
previously used to determine important cases in lieu of frontline judges,
are now also utilized much less frequently. Instead, many courts have
established “conferences of professional judges” on different subjects
122.
123.
124.

Interview with JC09, supra note 121.
E.g., Interview with JA04, supra note 86; Interview with JB03, supra note 78.
Krippner et al., supra note 27, at 116.
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of law to provide judges with advice on difficult cases. Unlike the
directives provided through the case-approval and adjudicationcommittee procedures, the advice of the conferences is non-binding,
and judges themselves remain fully responsible for their cases. The
reforms have also introduced a system of recording “interference with
cases by insiders of judicial organs,” which while rarely utilized,
further discourages court leaders from intervening in cases handled by
frontline judges.
Most interviewed judges and lawyers recognized that these
reforms have reduced external influence on courts cases, especially in
the vast majority of regular cases that do not involve extraordinarily
high monetary or political interests. While this has led to a less corrupt
and law-based adjudication process across regions, interviewees also
acknowledged that court leaders can still use informal influence over
their subordinates to interfere with cases. Such interference, however,
is mostly limited to cases with high economic or political stakes.
However, the reforms have also increased the rates of similar cases
treated differently and opinions containing legal errors because the old
approval process can no longer function as a check.
In addition to their effects on the judiciary’s functioning, these
reforms are likely to have broader implications for China’s judicial
politics, particularly the relationship between courts and local
governments (and/or local Communist Party apparatus). The
accountability reforms have weakened the traditional chain of
command that enabled local officials to convey their preferences about
court outcomes to frontline judges. According to Li, the typical
intervention process previously worked like this: a government or Party
leader would give instructions to a court leader, and the court leader
would relay the instructions down the chain until they reached a
frontline judge, who would then implement them. 125 Because frontline
judges were merely considered agents of their superiors, they would
normally not be held accountable for carrying out these instructions.126
By eliminating the case approval system and limiting the use of
adjudication committees, the accountability reforms make it
considerably harder for court leaders to dictate the outcomes of cases
handled by frontline judges, thus undermining the link between
officials and court cases. That said, it is likely that government and
125.
126.

Li, supra note 14, at 854–64.
Id. at 871.
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Party officials can still control cases that involve extraordinarily large
economic or political stakes, as even following the reforms, most such
cases fall into the jurisdiction of the adjudication committees.
In sum, although far from the all-around success claimed by the
Supreme People’s Court, 127 the accountability reforms have made
considerable inroads towards promoting judges’ autonomy and
accountability—at least for the time being. This conclusion defies the
prediction that local embeddedness would substantially hamper the
implementation of the reforms. This Article does, however, confirm
some of the bases for those predictions. For example, it validates Zhu’s
claim about the advantages of the vertical hierarchy, 128 as the
accountability reforms have indeed created a problem with low-quality
opinions and inconsistent rulings in local courts. The study also shows
that the reforms have substantially undermined many judges’ and court
leaders’ means to shirk responsibility and their opportunities for
corruption, which unavoidably contributes to the unpopularity of the
reforms within the judiciary. However, these obstacles only make the
reforms’ largely steadfast implementation seem all the more
significant.
Interestingly, what enables the accountability reforms to
overcome the seemly impenetrable local embeddedness is the regime’s
increasingly monolithic nature. If not for the sweeping anti-corruption
campaign and the subsequent centralization of political power, many
reform measures will likely be disregarded in practice, especially in
more rural and underdeveloped regions. Here lies one of the great
ironies surrounding the Chinese judiciary: as shown by the turn against
law under the politically fragmented—and consequently more
liberal—Hu Jintao administration 129 and the progress of the recent
reforms, the enhancement of the courts’ power and autonomy does not
seem to depend on the liberalization of the political system, but rather
on the power consolidation within the already authoritarian
government. This seemingly paradoxical relationship compels
researchers to reevaluate the diverse roles contemporary authoritarian
regimes play in shaping judicial behaviors.
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SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40, at 4.
Zhu, Investigation, supra note 21 at 336–337; Zhu, Knowledge, supra note 21 at
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